I.

Early this morning, American soldiers broke into the home of a foreign head of state while he slept. They dragged him and his wife from their bedroom and flew them by helicopter to a warship in the Caribbean.1 Explosions struck the capital city. Military installations burned. Civilians died — how many, we do not yet know. The seizure by military force of a sitting head of state — not a terrorist leader or non-state actor, but the sitting president of a nation of twenty-eight million people — without a preceding invasion or occupation, appears to be without modern precedent. The closest comparison, Noriega in 1989, involved a full invasion of a nation one-fourteenth the size.

Hours later, the American president held a press conference at his private club in Florida. He announced that the United States would “run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition.”2 He said American oil companies — “the biggest anywhere in the world” — would “go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.”3 Asked about the cost, he said it wouldn’t cost the United States anything, “because the money coming out of the ground is very substantial.”4 He claimed Venezuela’s oil had been “stolen” from America: “We built Venezuela’s oil industry with American talent, drive and skill, and the socialist regime stole it from us… This constituted one of the largest thefts of American property in the history of our country.”5

This is what happened on January 3, 2026. Various characterizations have been offered. Cuba called it “state terrorism.” Russia called it “armed aggression.” The UN Secretary-General said “the rules of international law have not been respected.” Each has a claim. “State terrorism” overstates — terrorism typically means targeting civilians to create fear, and this action targeted a head of state and military installations. “Armed aggression” is accurate but vague. The UN formulation is diplomatic understatement for “in breach of the UN Charter.”

In plain language: the abduction of a sitting president of a country with which we are not at war, the bombing of that nation’s capital, the announced occupation of said country, and an explicit claim on that nation’s resources.

This is aggression. The UN General Assembly spent fifty years, from the League of Nations through 1974, defining what that word means. Resolution 3314 lists acts that qualify “regardless of a declaration of war.” The list includes “invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State” and “bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State.” This morning’s action fits both.6

The language in American coverage is different. CNN’s live updates headline: “Maduro captured after US strike on Venezuela, Trump says.”7 Not abducted — captured. Senator Mike Lee, briefed by the Secretary of State, described the bombardment of Caracas as “kinetic action… deployed to protect and defend those executing the arrest warrant.”8 Not bombing — kinetic action. Not an act of war — executing an arrest warrant.

Axios notes that administration officials had “for months” been comparing Maduro to Noriega — “This could be Noriega part 2,” one official told the outlet in August.9 One CNN analysis piece describes the operation as “abducting a sitting president from his capital in the dead of night” — but this plain language appears in opinion, not in headlines, not in live coverage.10

The comparison to Panama is instructive in what it elides. Panama in 1989 had two million people. The United States had maintained a military presence in the Canal Zone for decades. Noriega had annulled an election seven months earlier; the opposition candidate, Guillermo Endara, was sworn in as president on a U.S. military base the day of the invasion — December 20, 1989. The legal framework, while contested internationally, rested on treaty obligations and an immediate democratic restoration. The person who won the election took office.11

Venezuela has twenty-eight million people. The United States has no legal presence there. The election Nicolás Maduro allegedly stole occurred eighteen months ago; the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, is in exile in Spain. The American president announced not a restoration of democratic governance but direct American control, with American companies designated to extract resources. The legal pretext is a 2020 drug-trafficking indictment — a domestic charge that confers no authority to invade another nation, seize its head of state, or occupy its territory. An indictment is not a license for war.

When nations have done what the United States did this morning — invaded a neighbor, removed its head of state by force, announced direct control, explicitly claimed its resources — we have historical precedents. We know what kind of nations have done this. We know under what circumstances, with what justifications, and with what consequences.

Across most coverage, the tone is procedural. Live updates track developments. Analysts discuss oil prices. Legal experts debate whether Congress should have been notified. The questions being asked — Will there be a trial? What happens next? Who governs Venezuela now? — are not unimportant. But they are procedural questions, not fundamental ones.

The question is whether Americans are prepared to see their nation in that company. What follows is the evidence that allows you to judge.

II. The Three Analogues

Suez, 1956

In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The waterway had been controlled by British and French interests since its construction in 1869; now it would belong to Egypt. Britain and France saw this as theft — the seizure of property they had built, maintained, and relied upon for the flow of Middle Eastern oil to European markets.

They decided to take it back by force.

On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces attacked across Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Two days later, under the pretext of “protecting” the canal from the warring parties, British and French troops landed in Egypt. The operation was coordinated in secret; Britain and France had colluded with Israel to manufacture the conditions for intervention. The goal was to recover the canal and, ideally, to remove Nasser from power.12

President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to permit it.

The United States condemned the invasion publicly, joining the Soviet Union in demanding withdrawal — a remarkable alignment of Cold War adversaries against America’s closest allies. But Eisenhower went further than words. When the fighting began, Nasser blocked the canal with sunken ships and saboteurs shut down a major pipeline bringing oil from Iraq to Western Europe. Deprived of their major sources of oil, the British needed American dollars to purchase fuel. The Eisenhower administration refused to cooperate.13

On October 31, Eisenhower addressed the American people by radio and television. His words were precise:

There can be no peace — without law. And there can be no law — if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us — and another for our friends.14

Within days, Britain and France agreed to a ceasefire. By December, their forces were withdrawing. By March 1957, Israel had withdrawn from the Sinai. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, humiliated, resigned in January 1957.

In the postwar order the United States had helped construct, great powers did not simply seize the resources of weaker nations by military force — not even when the property in question had genuinely been “theirs.”

Eisenhower again:

For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.14

The language of the current administration — “they stole it from us,” “the largest thefts of American property in the history of our country” — is precisely the language Britain and France used about the Suez Canal. The action — military intervention to recover resources a weaker nation had “taken” — is precisely the action Eisenhower stopped. The difference is that now there is no Eisenhower. No outside power capable of imposing consequences.

Crimea, 2014

On February 27, 2014, armed men in unmarked uniforms seized the parliament building in Simferopol, the capital of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. They carried Russian military weapons and wore Russian military gear, but bore no insignia. The Russian government denied any involvement. Within weeks, Vladimir Putin would acknowledge what everyone already knew: these were Russian special operations troops.15

Over the following three weeks, these forces seized government buildings, military bases, and critical infrastructure across Crimea. Ukrainian forces were given a choice: surrender or be attacked. Most surrendered.

On March 16, under military occupation, Crimea held a “referendum” on joining Russia. Armed soldiers stood outside polling places. No credible international observers were permitted. The Crimean government announced the result: 97 percent in favor, with 83 percent turnout.16 Crimean Tatar leaders, who boycotted the vote, disputed these figures; one report by a member of Russia’s own Presidential Human Rights Council estimated turnout at 30-50 percent, with only 50-60 percent of those voting yes.17 On March 27, the UN General Assembly voted 100-11 to declare the referendum invalid and affirm Ukraine’s territorial integrity.18

Two days after the vote, Putin signed a treaty annexing Crimea. The operation had taken less than a month.

The international response was unanimous condemnation. The United States and European Union imposed sanctions on Russian officials and entities. Diplomatic isolation followed.

Crimea remains under Russian control. The sanctions hurt but did not reverse the annexation. Putin absorbed the costs. If a great power acts quickly, presents the world with a fait accompli, and is willing to absorb consequences, condemnation without enforcement doesn’t change that fact.

Iraq-Kuwait, 1990

The most directly comparable action in modern history occurred on August 2, 1990, at 2:00 a.m. local time, when Iraqi forces crossed into Kuwait — the same hour American forces struck Caracas this morning.

Saddam Hussein claimed Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil through “slant drilling” into the Rumayla field that straddled their border. He claimed Kuwait’s overproduction was deliberate economic warfare — every dollar drop in oil prices cost Iraq a billion in annual revenue. He demanded that Kuwait forgive the debts Iraq had accumulated, arguing that Iraq had been defending the Gulf states and deserved compensation rather than repayment demands. He claimed Kuwait had been illegitimately “carved out” of Iraq by colonial powers.19

Within hours, Iraqi forces controlled the country. On August 28, Iraq declared that Kuwait had become its “nineteenth province.”

The international response was overwhelming. The UN Security Council condemned the invasion, demanded withdrawal, and authorized “all necessary means” to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty. A coalition comprising forces from thirty-four countries assembled under American leadership. In January 1991, Operation Desert Storm began. Within six weeks, Iraqi forces were expelled.19

The lesson of Kuwait is often cited as evidence that the international system works — that aggression will be reversed. But the lesson has a corollary: it works when the aggressor is a regional power that can be opposed by a superpower. Iraq could be expelled from Kuwait because the United States led the coalition. Russia could not be expelled from Crimea because no greater power existed to do the expelling. And the United States cannot be stopped in Venezuela because no nation or coalition has the capacity — or the will — to impose consequences on America.

Iraq-Kuwait shows what the action resembles. Crimea shows what happens when enforcement is impossible. Suez shows how America has behaved in the past.

The Pattern

Three kinds of nations appear in these cases.

Britain and France in 1956 were fading colonial powers whose empires were dissolving. They failed because a greater power stopped them.

Russia in 2014 was a faded superpower and dominant regional power, seizing territory where it held military dominance. It succeeded because no greater power could stop it.

Iraq in 1990 was a regional power overreaching, invading a neighbor in a region where it did not hold ultimate military dominance. It failed because a greater power reversed the action.

In each case, the outcome depended not on the justice of the cause or the validity of the justifications, but on the distribution of power. When a greater power opposed the action, the action failed. When no greater power could oppose it, the action succeeded.

The United States in 2026 is acting in a region where it holds uncontested military dominance, against a nation with no great-power protector, in pursuit of resources its president has explicitly claimed. By the logic of these precedents, the action will succeed — not because it is just, but because no one can stop it.

III. How This Became Possible

The United States did not arrive here suddenly. The conditions that permitted this morning’s action accumulated over decades.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war. The last time Congress exercised that power was December 1941. Since then, American presidents have ordered military action in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and dozens of smaller operations — none with a declaration of war. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed to reassert Congressional authority after Vietnam, has been treated by every subsequent president as advisory at best. Congress has largely acquiesced.

The Authorization for Use of Military Force passed three days after September 11, 2001, authorizes force against those who:

planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.20

That language — sixty words in total — has been invoked to justify operations in at least twenty-two countries, against groups that did not exist on September 11, in countries with no connection to the attacks.21 The legal architecture of the war on terror created a template: take a narrow authorization, stretch it beyond recognition, and treat Congressional silence as consent. Venezuela is not justified under the AUMF — even that stretched fabric would not cover a drug-trafficking indictment. But the pattern holds: act first, define the legal basis later, and count on Congress to acquiesce.

The war on drugs created a parallel template. For decades, America has treated drug trafficking as a national security threat justifying military and paramilitary action abroad — Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative, operations in Honduras, Guatemala, the Caribbean.22 The line between law enforcement and military action blurred. The 2020 indictment of Nicolás Maduro on drug trafficking charges was not unusual in itself — Washington has indicted foreign leaders before. What changed was the willingness to treat such an indictment as sufficient justification for invasion.

American exceptionalism provided the ideological permission. The belief that America acts differently — that our interventions serve democracy, stability, human rights, rather than mere interest — has deep roots. It permits Americans to see the same action as aggression when others do it and as liberation when we do. The invasion of Iraq was sold as bringing democracy to the Middle East. The occupation of Afghanistan was framed as nation-building. These framings failed, but the underlying belief persists: that American power is inherently different, that our motives purify our methods.

The final condition is the absence of constraint. In 1956, Britain and France were stopped because the United States could stop them. In 2026, no nation or coalition can impose costs on the United States sufficient to reverse its actions. China condemned the operation; so did Russia, Brazil, Cuba, and much of Latin America. The United Nations will debate. None of this is likely to change what happens on the ground. The international order that America helped build after World War II — the order Eisenhower defended at Suez — was always underwritten by American power. That power is now being used to dismantle the order it once enforced.

IV. What Makes This Different

Nicolás Maduro is not an innocent victim. He violently suppressed dissent. On July 28, 2024, he lost an election — opposition tallies showed his opponent receiving 67 percent of the vote — and refused to leave.23 The opposition candidate, Edmundo González, fled to Spain; the opposition leader, María Corina Machado, went into hiding. Maduro is a dictator who stole an election. Many Venezuelans — including many who fled to the United States — are celebrating his capture this morning.

Does this change the analysis?

It does not. The question is not whether Maduro deserved to remain in power. The question is whether the United States had the authority to remove him, and what it means that we did so in the way we did.

Return to the three analogues. At Suez, Britain and France claimed they were “protecting” the canal from warring parties; the pretext was thin, but they offered one. Russia denied its forces were in Crimea until the operation was complete; Putin manufactured a referendum, however fraudulent, to provide a veneer of self-determination. Even Saddam Hussein wrapped his invasion of Kuwait in historical grievance and economic complaint — he claimed Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil, not that Iraq intended to steal Kuwait’s.

This morning, the American president announced that American oil companies would “go in” to Venezuela, that the United States would “run the country,” and that the cost would be nothing because “the money coming out of the ground is very substantial.”24 There was no democratic pretext — no claim that the opposition had invited American forces, no suggestion that González would be installed as the rightful winner. No manufactured referendum. No suggestion that the occupation would be temporary or that Venezuelans would determine their own future. The resource claim was explicit, public, and proud.

Previous interventions — American and otherwise — at least paid tribute to the norms they violated. The tribute was often hypocritical, but hypocrisy acknowledges that norms exist, that they bind, that violating them requires justification. When you stop offering pretexts, you are announcing that the rules no longer apply to you.

Maduro’s crimes do not change this. Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator; his invasion of Kuwait was still an invasion. Slobodan Milošević committed atrocities in Kosovo; NATO’s intervention was still controversial precisely because it lacked UN authorization.25 The badness of a leader does not confer upon other nations the right to invade, occupy, and claim resources.

The history of American intervention in Latin America is long and often brutal — from the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala (1954) to the support for Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973) to the funding of the Contras in Nicaragua (1980s). But those interventions were covert, deniable, conducted through proxies. They violated international law, but they did not openly repudiate it.

Overt military actions at this scale have historically involved Congress. When George H. W. Bush invaded Panama in 1989, he called congressional leaders the night of the operation.26 Before bombing Baghdad in 2003, Congress voted to authorize the use of force.27 This morning, the administration did not notify the Gang of Eight — the congressional leaders who are briefed on the most sensitive operations — until after the strikes began. The president had said weeks earlier that he would not brief lawmakers because he feared they would “leak.”28

What happened this morning is different in kind: a public invasion, an announced occupation, an explicit claim on resources, no consultation with the legislature, defended not with embarrassment but with pride. The mask is off.

V. What the World Sees

The mask is off — and the world is watching.

Within hours of the American strikes, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva issued a statement:

Bombings on Venezuelan territory and the capture of its president cross an unacceptable line. These acts represent a most serious affront to Venezuela’s sovereignty and yet another extremely dangerous precedent for the entire international community… [This] recalls the worst moments of interference in the politics of Latin America and the Caribbean and threatens the preservation of the region as a zone of peace.29

Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose country shares a 1,400-mile border with Venezuela, announced the deployment of military forces to that border and called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum condemned the strikes as a violation of the UN Charter. Cuba’s Miguel Díaz-Canel called it “state terrorism.”30

Not all of Latin America condemned. Argentina’s Javier Milei — a close Trump ally who attended his inauguration and has cultivated strong ties to Washington — celebrated on social media: “That’s excellent news for the free world.” Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa called on María Corina Machado and Edmundo González to “reclaim your country.” El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, another Trump ally, was more cryptic: rather than comment directly, he reposted an old statement attacking Maduro.31

A US military strike in South America clarifies the costs of opposition. Milei and Noboa celebrated the outcome — the removal of Maduro — not the method. They did not defend the legality of the invasion or the announced American occupation. They did not claim the United States had the right to seize Venezuela’s oil.

The condemnations were different. They addressed the precedent.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, through his spokesperson, declared himself “deeply alarmed” and added: “Independently of the situation in Venezuela, these developments constitute a dangerous precedent.” He expressed deep concern “that the rules of international law have not been respected.”32 In plain language: this was in breach of the UN Charter. The President of the UN General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock, invoked Article 2 of the UN Charter: all member states must refrain from “the threat or use of force” against the territory or political independence of any other nation.33 At Colombia’s request, backed by Russia and China, the Security Council will convene Monday to address the American action.

America’s European allies responded with careful distance. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Britain was “not involved” and that “we should all uphold international law.” France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot stated that “no lasting political solution can be imposed from the outside.” Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz, while noting that Germany had not recognized Maduro’s disputed presidency, called the legal classification of the intervention “complex” and said Germany would “take time” on the matter.34 In plain language: we won’t defend this, but we won’t openly condemn our ally. Britain and France were the nations Eisenhower stopped at Suez.

A German member of parliament, Roderich Kiesewetter of the conservative Christian Democratic Union, was more direct:

With President Trump, the U.S. are abandoning the rules-based order that has shaped us since 1945… a return to the old U.S. doctrine from before 1940: a mindset of thinking in terms of spheres of influence.35

China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement:

China is deeply shocked and strongly condemns the use of force by the U.S. against a sovereign country and the use of force against the president of a country. China firmly opposes such hegemonic behaviour by the U.S., which seriously violates international law.36

Russia’s Foreign Ministry called the action “an unacceptable assault” on Venezuela’s sovereignty and “an act of armed aggression.”37

The split among leaders mirrored a split among people — or at least, the people we can see from here. In Caracas, Maduro supporters gathered near Miraflores palace and burned an American flag. But what Venezuelans are experiencing on the ground is largely invisible to international media. The Venezuelan voices most audible are those who already left: in Florida, Madrid, Bogotá, exiles celebrated the fall of the man who drove them out.38

The rest of the world read it differently. In Mexico City, protesters threw rocks at the U.S. Embassy and painted red handprints on its walls. In Buenos Aires, Rome, Berlin, crowds gathered at American embassies with variations on the same message: aggression, abduction, Yankees out.39

For eighty years, the United States positioned itself as the guarantor of the rules-based international order. Other nations violated that order — the Soviet Union in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Russia in Georgia and Ukraine, Iraq in Kuwait — but America was supposed to be different. America enforced the rules. When it bent them, as in Iraq in 2003, it at least constructed elaborate justifications: weapons of mass destruction, UN resolutions, coalition partners. The justifications were often false or exaggerated, but they paid tribute to the idea that rules existed and mattered.

This morning, the American president announced that American companies would take Venezuela’s oil because “they stole it from us.” He did not invoke international law. He did not claim UN authorization. He did not pretend the action served Venezuelan democracy — he said the United States would “run the country.” The resource claim was explicit.

The German parliamentarian’s phrase is precise: a return to thinking in terms of spheres of influence. Not rules that apply to all, but power that applies to some. Latin America is America’s sphere; Venezuela is in that sphere; therefore America can take what it wants. This is not the language of international law. It is the language of imperialism.

The world sees this. America’s allies distance themselves. America’s rivals condemn.

Eighty years ago, the United States helped build an international order in which great powers did not simply take what they wanted from weaker nations. This morning, an American president announced that American companies would extract Venezuelan oil because “they stole it from us.” He did not pretend otherwise.

There is an old word for taking another nation’s wealth by force, outside any legal framework, because no one can stop you. At sea, we called it piracy.

Sources:

  1. “Maduro and his wife were dragged from their bedroom by US forces during the raid, two sources familiar with the matter said.” CNN, “The US has captured Venezuelan leader Maduro. Here’s what to know,” January 3, 2026. ↩

  2. President Donald Trump, press conference, Mar-a-Lago, January 3, 2026. NBC News, “Trump says U.S. will govern Venezuela until there’s a ‘proper transition.’” ↩

  3. Ibid. ↩

  4. NBC News, “Trump says U.S. will govern Venezuela until there’s a ‘proper transition,’” January 3, 2026. ↩

  5. President Donald Trump, press conference, Mar-a-Lago, January 3, 2026. Time, “Trump Says U.S. Will ‘Run’ Venezuela and Take Control of Oil.” ↩

  6. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), “Definition of Aggression,” December 14, 1974. Article 3 lists acts qualifying as aggression “regardless of a declaration of war.” ↩

  7. CNN, “Live Updates: Maduro captured after US strike on Venezuela, Trump says,” January 3, 2026. ↩

  8. Senator Mike Lee, post on X, January 3, 2026, describing briefing from Secretary of State Marco Rubio. ↩

  9. Axios, “Maduro’s capture draws echoes of Noriega in 1990,” January 3, 2026. ↩

  10. CNN, “Trump’s snatching of Maduro shows a new level of unrestrained global power,” January 3, 2026. The piece uses “abducting” in analysis; CNN’s headlines and live coverage use “captured.” ↩

  11. On Panama: Election May 1989; annulled by Noriega; U.S. invasion December 20, 1989; Endara sworn in same day. See Britannica, “Operation Just Cause”; History.com, “The U.S. invades Panama.” ↩

  12. On the Suez Crisis and Anglo-French-Israeli collusion: Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; Bill of Rights Institute, “Eisenhower and the Suez Canal Crisis.” ↩

  13. Bill of Rights Institute, “Eisenhower and the Suez Canal Crisis”: “Deprived of their major sources of oil, the British needed dollars to purchase oil in the United States, but the administration refused to cooperate, and the British were forced to withdraw.” ↩

  14. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East,” October 31, 1956. The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara. Both quotes verbatim. ↩ ↩2

  15. NBC News, “Vladimir Putin Admits Russian Forces Helped Crimea Separatists,” April 17, 2014. ↩

  16. Brookings Institution, “Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer to resolution,” March 2019: “The referendum unsurprisingly produced a Soviet-style result: 97 percent allegedly voted to join Russia with a turnout of 83 percent.” ↩

  17. Atlantic Council, “Setting the Record Straight on Crimea,” 2019, citing the Bobrov report on the Russian President’s Human Rights Council website. ↩

  18. United Nations, “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region,” March 27, 2014. Vote: 100 in favor, 11 against, 58 abstentions. ↩

  19. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, “The Gulf War, 1991.” Coalition size: “Comprising forces from thirty-four countries.” ↩ ↩2

  20. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Public Law 107-40, September 18, 2001. Section 2(a), quoted verbatim. ↩

  21. Stephanie Savell, “The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: A Comprehensive Look at Where and How It Has Been Used,” Costs of War Project, Brown University, 2021. The study found the AUMF cited to justify operations in 22 countries. ↩

  22. On Plan Colombia: Congressional Research Service, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” updated regularly. The U.S. provided Colombia over $10 billion in aid between 2000 and 2015. On the Mérida Initiative: Congressional Research Service, “Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations,” updated regularly. The U.S. provided Mexico $3.5 billion from 2008 to 2021. ↩

  23. The Carter Center, “Center Finds Democracy Thwarted in Venezuela,” 2024. The Carter Center was unable to verify the government’s claimed results. Opposition tallies, based on precinct-level tally sheets covering 80% of precincts, showed “González Urrutia carrying an overwhelming 67% of the vote.” ↩

  24. See footnotes 2, 3, and 4 above. ↩

  25. Slobodan Milošević was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1999. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo that year lacked UN Security Council authorization; Russia and China had indicated they would veto. The legal basis remains contested. See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “The Kosovo Report,” 2000. ↩

  26. UPI, “Military action wins bipartisan support from Congress,” December 20, 1989. “Bush informed congressional leaders, in keeping with the requirements of the War Powers Act, reaching Senate Democratic leader George Mitchell of Maine on a secure line at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City after midnight.” ↩

  27. Council on Foreign Relations, “TWE Remembers: Congress’s Vote to Authorize the Gulf War,” January 2016. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq was passed by Congress on October 16, 2002. ↩

  28. CNBC, “Trump’s removal of Maduro prompts questions from Congress,” January 3, 2026. “Top congressional leaders — comprising the ‘Gang of 8’ — did not receive a briefing from the administration before the U.S. strike in Venezuela began.” ↩

  29. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, statements on X, January 3, 2026. Al Jazeera, “World reacts to US bombing of Venezuela, ‘capture’ of Maduro.” ↩

  30. On Colombia: Al Jazeera, ibid. Colombia shares a 2,219 km (1,379 mi) border with Venezuela. On Mexico: NPR, “U.S. strikes on Venezuela spark alarm across Latin America and beyond.” On Cuba: Al Jazeera, ibid. ↩

  31. On Argentina (Milei) and Ecuador (Noboa): Al Jazeera, ibid.; Time, “How the World Is Reacting to the U.S. Capture of Nicolas Maduro.” On Milei as “a close ally to Trump”: The Hill, “Trump’s Venezuela operation polarizes world leaders.” ↩

  32. UN News, “US actions in Venezuela ‘constitute a dangerous precedent’: Guterres,” January 3, 2026. Quotes from Secretary-General’s spokesperson. ↩

  33. On General Assembly President Baerbock citing Article 2: CNBC, “‘A dangerous precedent’: World leaders react to the U.S. attack on Venezuela.” ↩

  34. On UK (Starmer), France (Barrot), and Germany (Merz): Times of Israel, “Russia, Iran slam Venezuela strikes as EU and UK urge respect for international law.” Also: Global Times, “Multiple countries react after US bombing of Venezuela.” ↩

  35. Roderich Kiesewetter MP (CDU), quoted in CNBC, ibid. Kiesewetter is a member of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee. ↩

  36. Global Times, “Multiple countries react after US bombing of Venezuela.” ↩

  37. TASS, “Russian Foreign Ministry condemns US armed aggression against Venezuela.” ↩

  38. On Caracas flag-burning: Al Jazeera, “Updates: Maduro brought to New York after being seized by US in Venezuela.” On diaspora celebrations: US News, “Venezuela Diaspora Celebrates Maduro’s Deposition, Wonders What’s Next”; Al Jazeera, “Fear, joy, hope: Venezuelans react to Maduro capture.” ↩

  39. On Mexico City embassy protest: U.S. Embassy Mexico, “Demonstration Alert: Protests and Vandalism Outside the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City.” On Buenos Aires, Rome, Berlin: Al Jazeera live coverage and wire services. ↩